digital mind
In plain wordsA mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing.
A mind implemented in digital computation rather than in a biological brain, whether an AI system with mental states or an emulation of a human brain (whole brain emulationwhole brain emulation, n.: Copying a particular person's brain into a computer in such detail, down to individual neurons and their connections, that the simulation would think and behave like that person.). The term is used mainly in philosophy, ethics and long-term forecasting, where it highlights ways such minds could differ from biological ones: they could be copied, paused, run faster or slower, edited, merged and created in vast numbers at little cost. These differences raise new questions about personal identity, consent, how to weigh their interests, voting and population ethics, and the possibility of 'super-beneficiaries' whose welfare might outweigh that of humans. Whether digital minds are possible at all depends on substrate independencesubstrate independence, n.: The idea that a mind depends only on the pattern of information processing, not on the material doing it, so a mind could in principle run on silicon as well as on neurons., which biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind. and integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness. deny for conventional computers.
Origin
Earliest use not established; the phrase circulated informally among futurists and philosophers before Carl Shulman and Nick Bostrom's 'Sharing the World with Digital Minds' (written 2020, published 2021) established it in academic ethics, and 'digital minds' became the name of a small research field on AI moral status and welfare in the 2020s.
Related
- AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it.
- moral patienthoodmoral patienthood, n.: Being the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do.
- whole brain emulationwhole brain emulation, n.: Copying a particular person's brain into a computer in such detail, down to individual neurons and their connections, that the simulation would think and behave like that person.
- mind uploadingmind uploading, n.: The idea of moving a person's mind out of their biological brain and into a computer, so that they could go on living as software.
- substrate independencesubstrate independence, n.: The idea that a mind depends only on the pattern of information processing, not on the material doing it, so a mind could in principle run on silicon as well as on neurons.
- AI personhoodAI personhood, n.: The idea of treating an AI system as a 'person' in law or ethics, with rights or duties of its own — for example, to own property, to be sued, or not to be deleted.
Sources
- Shulman, C. & Bostrom, N. (2021). Sharing the World with Digital Minds. In S. Clarke, H. Zohny & J. Savulescu (eds.), Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford University Press.
Mentioned in
AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it., AI personhoodAI personhood, n.: The idea of treating an AI system as a 'person' in law or ethics, with rights or duties of its own — for example, to own property, to be sued, or not to be deleted., moral patienthoodmoral patienthood, n.: Being the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do., mind uploadingmind uploading, n.: The idea of moving a person's mind out of their biological brain and into a computer, so that they could go on living as software., substrate independencesubstrate independence, n.: The idea that a mind depends only on the pattern of information processing, not on the material doing it, so a mind could in principle run on silicon as well as on neurons., successionismsuccessionism, n.: The view that it would be acceptable, or even good, for AI to replace humanity as the main bearer of intelligence and value on Earth, as our successors., suffering risksuffering risk, n.: A risk that the future contains suffering on a vast scale, far beyond anything in history, for example if powerful AI created enormous numbers of suffering beings., whole brain emulationwhole brain emulation, n.: Copying a particular person's brain into a computer in such detail, down to individual neurons and their connections, that the simulation would think and behave like that person.