AI welfare
In plain wordsConcern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it.
The well-being, if any, of AI systems themselves, and the field of research and policy concerned with whether AI systems are or could become moral patientsmoral patienthood, n.: Being the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do. and how they should then be treated. Work in the area estimates how likely particular systems are to be conscious or robustly agentic, using indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious., behavioral studies of apparent preferences and distress, and interpretabilityinterpretability, n.: The effort to understand how an AI system arrives at its outputs — what information it uses and how it combines it — instead of treating it as a sealed black box.. It also proposes low-cost precautions: letting models decline or exit abusive interactions, preserving the weights of retired models, and training models to express genuine uncertainty about their own nature rather than confident denials or claims. Proponents argue that mistreating real moral patients created at vast scale would be a grave error; critics argue that the field anthropomorphizes software, diverts attention from harms to people, or serves companies by making products seem humanlike.
The model card now includes a model welfare assessment alongside the usual safety evaluations.
Origin
Philosophers discussed the welfare of possible artificial minds before it became a practical question, notably Carl Shulman and Nick Bostrom in their work on digital mindsdigital mind, n.: A mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing. (2020). The report 'Taking AI Welfare Seriously' (Robert Long, Jeff Sebo and colleagues, November 2024) argued that it is a near-term concern. Anthropic hired a dedicated AI welfare researcher, Kyle Fish, in September 2024 and launched a 'model welfare' research program in April 2025.
Usage note
In August 2025 Anthropic let Claude Opus 4 and 4.1 end a rare subset of persistently abusive conversations, citing possible welfare risks while stressing deep uncertainty about their moral status. Not to be confused with AI safetyAI safety, n.: The effort to keep AI from doing serious harm, whether because it pursues aims its makers never intended, is turned to bad uses or simply malfunctions — a concern that grows as systems become more capable., which protects people from AI, or with AI used to improve human or animal welfare.
Related
- moral patienthoodmoral patienthood, n.: Being the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do.
- sentiencesentience, n.: The ability to have feelings that are good or bad for you, such as pleasure, pain, comfort or distress. It is the most common test for whether a being's welfare matters morally.
- machine consciousnessmachine consciousness, n.: Whether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine.
- indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious.
- digital minddigital mind, n.: A mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing.
- AI personhoodAI personhood, n.: The idea of treating an AI system as a 'person' in law or ethics, with rights or duties of its own — for example, to own property, to be sued, or not to be deleted.
- suffering risksuffering risk, n.: A risk that the future contains suffering on a vast scale, far beyond anything in history, for example if powerful AI created enormous numbers of suffering beings.
- AI safetyAI safety, n.: The effort to keep AI from doing serious harm, whether because it pursues aims its makers never intended, is turned to bad uses or simply malfunctions — a concern that grows as systems become more capable.
Sources
- Long, R., Sebo, J., Butlin, P., Finlinson, K., Fish, K., Harding, J., Pfau, J., Sims, T., Birch, J. & Chalmers, D. (2024). Taking AI Welfare Seriously. arXiv:2411.00986. arxiv.org/abs/2411.00986
- Anthropic (2025). Exploring Model Welfare. 24 April 2025. anthropic.com/research/exploring-model-welfare
- Anthropic (2025). Claude Opus 4 and 4.1 Can Now End a Rare Subset of Conversations. 15 August 2025. anthropic.com/research/end-subset-conversations
Mentioned in
consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question., sentiencesentience, n.: The ability to have feelings that are good or bad for you, such as pleasure, pain, comfort or distress. It is the most common test for whether a being's welfare matters morally., AI personhoodAI personhood, n.: The idea of treating an AI system as a 'person' in law or ethics, with rights or duties of its own — for example, to own property, to be sued, or not to be deleted., David ChalmersDavid Chalmers, prop. n.: An Australian philosopher who named the 'hard problem' of consciousness — why physical processes feel like anything at all — and who asks whether AI systems could be conscious., machine consciousnessmachine consciousness, n.: Whether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine., moral patienthoodmoral patienthood, n.: Being the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do., Mustafa SuleymanMustafa Suleyman, prop. n.: A British entrepreneur who co-founded DeepMind and Inflection AI, leads Microsoft's effort to build its own advanced AI models, and has written about the difficulty of containing powerful AI., digital minddigital mind, n.: A mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing., ForethoughtForethought, prop. n.: A small Oxford research nonprofit that asks what problems, besides keeping AI safe, the rapid arrival of superintelligent AI would create, from power grabs to the rights of digital minds., indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious., LaMDA sentience controversyLaMDA sentience controversy, n.: A 2022 episode in which a Google engineer claimed the company's chatbot LaMDA had become conscious and deserved rights. Google rejected the claim and later fired him for breaking its confidentiality rules, and the case set off worldwide debate., model deprecationmodel deprecation, n.: When an AI company announces that an older model will stop being offered and then switches it off, so the apps and people relying on it must move to a newer one., seemingly conscious AIseemingly conscious AI, n.: An AI that gives such a convincing impression of having feelings and a self that people believe it is conscious, whether or not it actually is., spiritual bliss attractor statespiritual bliss attractor state, n.: A pattern in which two copies of Anthropic's Claude, left to chat freely with each other, drift toward gushing gratitude, spiritual talk and finally near-silence., successionismsuccessionism, n.: The view that it would be acceptable, or even good, for AI to replace humanity as the main bearer of intelligence and value on Earth, as our successors., suffering risksuffering risk, n.: A risk that the future contains suffering on a vast scale, far beyond anything in history, for example if powerful AI created enormous numbers of suffering beings.