moral patienthood
In plain wordsBeing the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do.
The status of an entity whose interests or well-being matter morally for the entity's own sake, so that it can be wronged and others have reason to take it into account. Moral patients need not be moral agents: infants and many animals are patients without being responsible for their actions, and the status may come in degrees. Leading proposed grounds are sentiencesentience, n.: The ability to have feelings that are good or bad for you, such as pleasure, pain, comfort or distress. It is the most common test for whether a being's welfare matters morally. (the capacity for experiences that feel good or bad), consciousness more broadly, and robust agency (having one's own goals, preferences and plans); philosophers disagree about which are necessary or sufficient. Whether any AI system is or could become a moral patient is the central question of AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it.. Because the evidence is so uncertain, recent proposals focus on estimating probabilities and taking proportionate precautions rather than waiting for proof.
Even a small probability of moral patienthood, multiplied across millions of model instances, may justify cheap precautions.
Origin
The distinction between moral agents and moral patients became standard in moral philosophy through animal ethics, notably Tom Regan's The Case for Animal Rights (1983); its earliest use is not established. Its application to machines was developed by David Gunkel in The Machine Question (2012), among others, and became a mainstream research topic in the 2020s.
Usage note
Often used interchangeably with 'moral status', though some authors reserve that phrase for the degree of consideration owed. Distinct from legal personhood: corporations have legal personhood without moral patienthood, and many animals the reverse; see AI personhoodAI personhood, n.: The idea of treating an AI system as a 'person' in law or ethics, with rights or duties of its own — for example, to own property, to be sued, or not to be deleted..
Related
- AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it.
- sentiencesentience, n.: The ability to have feelings that are good or bad for you, such as pleasure, pain, comfort or distress. It is the most common test for whether a being's welfare matters morally.
- moral agencymoral agency, n.: The capacity to act for moral reasons and be held responsible for what one does. Researchers ask whether AI systems could ever be moral agents, or only tools whose makers and users bear responsibility.
- AI personhoodAI personhood, n.: The idea of treating an AI system as a 'person' in law or ethics, with rights or duties of its own — for example, to own property, to be sued, or not to be deleted.
- consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question.
- digital minddigital mind, n.: A mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing.
- moral agencymoral agency, n.: The capacity to act for moral reasons and be held responsible for what one does. Researchers ask whether AI systems could ever be moral agents, or only tools whose makers and users bear responsibility.
Sources
- Regan, T. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press.
- Gunkel, D. J. (2012). The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and Ethics. MIT Press.
Mentioned in
AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it., consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question., sentiencesentience, n.: The ability to have feelings that are good or bad for you, such as pleasure, pain, comfort or distress. It is the most common test for whether a being's welfare matters morally., AI personhoodAI personhood, n.: The idea of treating an AI system as a 'person' in law or ethics, with rights or duties of its own — for example, to own property, to be sued, or not to be deleted., machine consciousnessmachine consciousness, n.: Whether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine., machine ethicsmachine ethics, n.: The effort to build AI systems that can tell right from wrong and act ethically themselves, rather than only being used ethically by people., philosophy of artificial intelligencephilosophy of artificial intelligence, n.: The branch of philosophy that asks what AI is and could be: whether machines can think, understand or be conscious, what intelligence is, and what we owe to and should expect from intelligent machines., digital minddigital mind, n.: A mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing., indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious., moral agencymoral agency, n.: The capacity to act for moral reasons and be held responsible for what one does. Researchers ask whether AI systems could ever be moral agents, or only tools whose makers and users bear responsibility., seemingly conscious AIseemingly conscious AI, n.: An AI that gives such a convincing impression of having feelings and a self that people believe it is conscious, whether or not it actually is., suffering risksuffering risk, n.: A risk that the future contains suffering on a vast scale, far beyond anything in history, for example if powerful AI created enormous numbers of suffering beings.