substrate independence

The thesis that mental properties, including consciousness, depend only on the computational or functional organization of a system and not on the physical material that implements it, so that a mind could in principle run on silicon chips, or on any other medium able to carry out the same computations, as well as on neurons. It combines multiple realizabilitymultiple realizability, n.: The idea that the same mental state, such as pain, could be produced by very different physical systems — human brains, octopus brains or perhaps computers — just as one program can run on different machines. with computational functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior., and is presupposed by whole brain emulationwhole brain emulation, n.: Copying a particular person's brain into a computer in such detail, down to individual neurons and their connections, that the simulation would think and behave like that person., mind uploadingmind uploading, n.: The idea of moving a person's mind out of their biological brain and into a computer, so that they could go on living as software., many discussions of digital mindsdigital mind, n.: A mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing. and Nick Bostrom's simulation argument. Opponents, including defenders of biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind. and of integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness., hold that consciousness depends on causal or biological features of the physical system itself, so that even a perfect computer simulation of a brain might not be conscious.