panpsychism
In plain wordsThe idea that some simple form of experience is a basic feature of all matter, so that minds like ours are built out of tiny glimmers of mind found everywhere.
The view that the most basic constituents of nature already have some mental aspect, usually a rudimentary form of experience, so that the consciousness of humans and animals is built up or derived from mind present throughout matter. Contemporary versions, motivated chiefly by the hard problem of consciousnesshard problem of consciousness, n.: The puzzle of why physical processes in a brain — or a computer — should feel like anything from the inside, rather than simply running without any inner experience., hold that physics describes only the structure and dispositions of matter and that experience may be its intrinsic nature (Russellian monism). The central difficulty is the combination problem: how micro-level experiences could combine into a unified subject like a person. Panpsychism does not by itself imply that computers are conscious, since a system as a whole may need the right kind of unity to be a subject; integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness. is often called panpsychist-leaning because it attributes some consciousness to many simple physical systems.
Origin
From Greek pan, 'all', and psyche, 'soul, mind'. The term is traced to the Renaissance philosopher Francesco Patrizi, whose Nova de universis philosophia (1591) includes a part titled 'Pampsychia'; the idea is often traced to Thales, who held that all things are full of gods, and Spinoza and Leibniz held related views. Galen Strawson (2006), Philip Goff and others revived it in analytic philosophy.
Related
- hard problem of consciousnesshard problem of consciousness, n.: The puzzle of why physical processes in a brain — or a computer — should feel like anything from the inside, rather than simply running without any inner experience.
- integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness.
- consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question.
- biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind.
- mind–body problemmind–body problem, n.: The age-old question of how the mind — thoughts, feelings, experiences — relates to the physical body and brain. Is the mind simply what the brain does, or something more?
- illusionismillusionism, n.: The view that the inner glow of experience that seems so hard to explain is a kind of trick the brain plays on itself: we are conscious, but not in the mysterious way it seems.
Sources
- Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11), 3–31.
- Goff, P. (2019). Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. Pantheon.
Mentioned in
David ChalmersDavid Chalmers, prop. n.: An Australian philosopher who named the 'hard problem' of consciousness — why physical processes feel like anything at all — and who asks whether AI systems could be conscious., hard problem of consciousnesshard problem of consciousness, n.: The puzzle of why physical processes in a brain — or a computer — should feel like anything from the inside, rather than simply running without any inner experience., integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness., mind–body problemmind–body problem, n.: The age-old question of how the mind — thoughts, feelings, experiences — relates to the physical body and brain. Is the mind simply what the brain does, or something more?, illusionismillusionism, n.: The view that the inner glow of experience that seems so hard to explain is a kind of trick the brain plays on itself: we are conscious, but not in the mysterious way it seems.