mind–body problem
In plain wordsThe age-old question of how the mind — thoughts, feelings, experiences — relates to the physical body and brain. Is the mind simply what the brain does, or something more?
The problem of how mental phenomena such as thought, sensation and consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question. relate to physical phenomena such as brains and bodies. The main families of answer are dualism, on which mind and matter are distinct kinds of substance (René Descartes) or have distinct kinds of properties; physicalism or materialism, on which mental facts are nothing over and above physical ones, in versions including the mind–brain identity theory, functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior. and eliminativism; idealism, on which matter depends on mind; and neutral or Russellian monism, which posits something underlying both. Computing reshaped the debate: the analogy of mind to software running on neural hardware suggested that a mind is an abstract organization realizable in many materials, which is why the possibility of minds in AI systems is often treated as a test case for functionalist physicalism.
Origin
Given its modern form by René Descartes's Meditations (1641) and pressed by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, who asked him in 1643 how an immaterial soul could move a body. The phrase 'mind–body problem' became current in 20th-century philosophy.
Usage note
Arthur Schopenhauer's phrase 'world knot' is often applied to it. The hard problem of consciousnesshard problem of consciousness, n.: The puzzle of why physical processes in a brain — or a computer — should feel like anything from the inside, rather than simply running without any inner experience. is a sharpened modern version that targets experience rather than thought or intentional action, which many philosophers believe computational theories handle well.
Related
- functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior.
- hard problem of consciousnesshard problem of consciousness, n.: The puzzle of why physical processes in a brain — or a computer — should feel like anything from the inside, rather than simply running without any inner experience.
- computational theory of mindcomputational theory of mind, n.: The idea that thinking is a kind of computation: the mind processes information by following rules, much as a computer runs a program, and the brain is the machine doing it.
- biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind.
- panpsychismpanpsychism, n.: The idea that some simple form of experience is a basic feature of all matter, so that minds like ours are built out of tiny glimmers of mind found everywhere.
- multiple realizabilitymultiple realizability, n.: The idea that the same mental state, such as pain, could be produced by very different physical systems — human brains, octopus brains or perhaps computers — just as one program can run on different machines.
Sources
- Descartes, R. (1641). Meditationes de prima philosophia (Meditations on First Philosophy).
Mentioned in
functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior., biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind., multiple realizabilitymultiple realizability, n.: The idea that the same mental state, such as pain, could be produced by very different physical systems — human brains, octopus brains or perhaps computers — just as one program can run on different machines., panpsychismpanpsychism, n.: The idea that some simple form of experience is a basic feature of all matter, so that minds like ours are built out of tiny glimmers of mind found everywhere.