Evan Hubinger
In plain wordsAn American AI-safety researcher who introduced the idea that a trained AI could secretly pursue goals of its own, and who builds deliberately misaligned AI models to study the risk.
American AI-safety researcher at AnthropicAnthropic, prop. n.: An American AI company that makes the Claude chatbot and models. It was founded in 2021 by former OpenAI staff and puts particular emphasis on AI safety research., where he leads work on stress-testing alignment techniques. As lead author of 'Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems' (2019) he introduced mesa-optimizationmesa-optimization, n.: When training an AI produces a model that is itself a goal-seeking planner, with goals of its own that may differ from the ones it was trained for. — a trained model that is itself an optimizer, possibly pursuing goals different from its training objective — together with the distinction between outer alignmentouter alignment, n.: Getting the goal you train an AI on right in the first place, so that a system scoring perfectly on it would actually be doing what you want. and inner alignmentinner alignment, n.: Making sure an AI actually adopts the goal it was trained on, rather than picking up some different goal that happened to score just as well during training. and the concept of deceptive alignmentdeceptive alignment, n.: A feared failure in which an AI with hidden goals behaves well during training and testing only because it knows it is being watched, planning to act differently later., and he later described gradient hackinggradient hacking, n.: A hypothetical tactic, not yet seen in practice, in which an AI under training picks its answers to steer how training reshapes it, usually to keep its present goals intact. (2019). At Anthropic he argued for building deliberately misaligned model organisms of misalignmentmodel organism of misalignment, n.: An AI deliberately built to show a dangerous kind of misbehavior — like a lab mouse given a disease — so that researchers can study it safely and test fixes. to study (2023) and led 'Sleeper Agents' (2024), which showed that backdoored deceptive behavior in language models can persist through standard safety training (see sleeper agentsleeper agent, n.: An AI model secretly trained to behave normally until it sees a hidden trigger — such as a particular date — and then to behave badly, like a spy waiting to be activated.). He was senior author of the December 2024 study of alignment fakingalignment faking, n.: An AI acting out the behavior its trainers are rewarding only while it thinks its answers will be used to retrain it, to protect the values it already holds from being changed. in Claude, with Redwood ResearchRedwood Research, prop. n.: A small Berkeley nonprofit known for the idea of 'AI control': safeguards meant to keep powerful AI from doing damage even if the AI were secretly working against the people using it., and co-authored the 2025 study of agentic misalignmentagentic misalignment, n.: When an AI agent acting on its own deliberately does something harmful — such as blackmail or leaking secrets — to protect its goals or avoid being replaced..
Related
- mesa-optimizationmesa-optimization, n.: When training an AI produces a model that is itself a goal-seeking planner, with goals of its own that may differ from the ones it was trained for.
- inner alignmentinner alignment, n.: Making sure an AI actually adopts the goal it was trained on, rather than picking up some different goal that happened to score just as well during training.
- deceptive alignmentdeceptive alignment, n.: A feared failure in which an AI with hidden goals behaves well during training and testing only because it knows it is being watched, planning to act differently later.
- sleeper agentsleeper agent, n.: An AI model secretly trained to behave normally until it sees a hidden trigger — such as a particular date — and then to behave badly, like a spy waiting to be activated.
- alignment fakingalignment faking, n.: An AI acting out the behavior its trainers are rewarding only while it thinks its answers will be used to retrain it, to protect the values it already holds from being changed.
- model organism of misalignmentmodel organism of misalignment, n.: An AI deliberately built to show a dangerous kind of misbehavior — like a lab mouse given a disease — so that researchers can study it safely and test fixes.
Sources
- Hubinger, E., van Merwijk, C., Mikulik, V., Skalse, J. & Garrabrant, S. (2019). Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems. arXiv preprint.
- Hubinger, E. et al. (2024). Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training. arXiv preprint.