neural correlates of consciousness
In plain wordsThe particular brain activity that reliably goes with a conscious experience — the minimum the brain must be doing for you to see, hear or feel something.
Brain activity that systematically accompanies conscious experience; more strictly, following Christof Koch and others, the smallest set of neural events that would on its own be enough to produce a given experience (content-specific correlates) or to make the subject conscious at all (full or state correlates). Researchers seek them by contrasting conditions in which stimulation is held constant while experience differs — binocular rivalry, visual masking, blindsight, anesthesia, sleep — and asking which brain activity tracks the difference, while separating the correlates from mere prerequisites and consequences such as attention and report. Candidates include a posterior cortical 'hot zone' and fronto-parietal networks, a dispute central to testing integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness. against global workspace theoryglobal workspace theory, n.: A leading scientific theory holding that we become conscious of something when the brain broadcasts it widely — as if putting it on a stage where every part of the mind can use it.. Correlates do not by themselves explain why any activity is conscious, and they do not transfer directly to AI systems, which lack neurons — one reason for the turn to functional indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious..
Origin
Francis Crick and Christof Koch launched the modern search in 'Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness' (Seminars in the Neurosciences, 1990). The phrase, whose earliest use is not established, and the abbreviation NCC became standard during the 1990s, and David Chalmers proposed a widely used definition in 'What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?' (2000).
Related
- consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question.
- global workspace theoryglobal workspace theory, n.: A leading scientific theory holding that we become conscious of something when the brain broadcasts it widely — as if putting it on a stage where every part of the mind can use it.
- integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness.
- recurrent processing theoryrecurrent processing theory, n.: A theory that we consciously see something only when signals in the brain's visual areas loop back on themselves, not when they merely sweep forward once.
- indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious.
- machine consciousnessmachine consciousness, n.: Whether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine.
Sources
- Crick, F. & Koch, C. (1990). Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 263–275.
- Chalmers, D. J. (2000). What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In T. Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
Mentioned in
consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question., David ChalmersDavid Chalmers, prop. n.: An Australian philosopher who named the 'hard problem' of consciousness — why physical processes feel like anything at all — and who asks whether AI systems could be conscious., global workspace theoryglobal workspace theory, n.: A leading scientific theory holding that we become conscious of something when the brain broadcasts it widely — as if putting it on a stage where every part of the mind can use it., integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness., Giulio TononiGiulio Tononi, prop. n.: An Italian-American neuroscientist who created integrated information theory, which measures consciousness by how unified a system's internal causes are, and which implies ordinary computers are not conscious., indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious., recurrent processing theoryrecurrent processing theory, n.: A theory that we consciously see something only when signals in the brain's visual areas loop back on themselves, not when they merely sweep forward once.